




Theory to Manage Economic 
Policy 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 
It is a great pleasure for me to participate in thls event celebrating)ean-
Paul Fitoussi's contribution to economics and to public life. There are so 
many aspects of his work and of his collaborations over a long period 
of years on which I feel I should comment: His role, for instance, in 
the International Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress, has provided a critical impetus to 
what is now a major global move1nent. The commission's work was not 
just about measurement; it was about shaping our society, for what we 
measure affects what we do, 1 I should talk too about his contributions 
over a quarter century to the International Econon1ic Association, where 
he served as Secretary General, and which he continues to advise. I could 
talk as well about his efforts to reshape the Cf20 agenda when France 
chaired that group,2 or the work we did together in the Commission 
of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on 
Reforms of the Internatiortal Monetary and Financial System, in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis. 3 
But I have been asked to talk about macroeconomics, where Fitoussi 
has been a persistent advocate of policies that maintain full employ-
ment and institutional reforms, which would rnake it inore likely that 
such policies would be adopted. But, of course, if we are to adopt policies 
that ensure full employment, we must understand why the economy 
often - as now - operates far below its potential. It should be evident 
that the macroeconomic models that predominated before the crisis 
were inadequate. VVe have to reconstruct macroeconomic theory if °\'Ve 
are to do a better job in managing economy policy - the subject of this 
session, and the subject of much of Fitoussi's life's work. 
·rhe subject itself reflects a distinctive aspect of his work: a deep 
commitment to economic science, to the 11otion that economic policy 
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has to be rooted in an understanding of economic fundarnentals; and 
a deep commitrnent to policy~ to the notion that our knowledge, such 
as it ls, cannot remain within the ivory tower, and must be used to the 
betterment of mankind. His belief in democracy and democratic institu-
tions has rneant that he has worked hard not only to advocate institu-
tions, such as central banks, which are more den1ocratically accountable, 
but to translate the abstract ideas of economic theorists into a language 
that is rnore widely understandable. If our democracy and our econorny 
are to work, there must be more of those with the dedication thatJean-
Paul Fitoussi has dernonstrated. 
Wl1y macroeconomics needs to be reconstructed4 
No one would, or at least should, say that macroeconomics 11as done 
well in recent years. 'The standard rnodels not only didn't predict the 
Great Recession, they also said it couldn't happen~ bubbles don't exist 
in well-functioning economies of the kind assumed in the standard 
model. Not surprisingly, even after the bubble broke, the models didn't 
predict the full consequences, and they haven't provided good guid-
ance to policymakers in responding to the crisis. A half decade after the 
bursting of the bubble, US unemployment is still high-with almost one 
out of eight Americans who would like a full-tilne job not being able to 
get one.5 The goverrnnent is still financing almost all mortgages. 
So, too, our standard models didn't predict either the occurrence of or 
the follow-on from the euro crisis- neither its occurrence nor its evolution, 
including the high levels of unemployrnent that persist today, and a down-
turn that in some countries is comparable to that of the Cireat Depression. 
The assertions about how well the economy 1-vas performing just before 
the crisis by those who relied on such models are a painful testa1nent to 
how badly our rnodels performed. As Robert Wade6 has written: 
ln April 2006 Anne Krueger, deputy ma11aging director of the IMF, 
announced the IMF's view that "the world economy has rarely been in 
better shape." 7 In Wlay 2007,Jean-Philippe Cotis, the chief economist 
of the ()ECO, presented the OECD's vie;.v that "the current economic 
situation is in 1nany ways better than what we have experienced in 
years ... Our central forecast remains quite benign ... !we expect the 
OEC1) to show] strong job creation and falling unemployment,"B 
'111ese assertions of confidence in the economy were made after tl1e 
housing bubble - which was the precipitating event that brought on 
.-~---------------------=~·-·· ---
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the crisis·- had already broken. Even after the bubble broke, Bernanke 
predicted that the crisis would be contained.9 Their record in seeing that 
thereV>'as a bubble, let alone predicting when it would burst, was perhaps 
even rnore dismal. When shortly before the bubble broke, Greenspan 
was asked whether there was a bubble, he replied that there was not ·-
just "a little froth" on the econorny. 10 
The test of science is predlction - and one should have some skepti-
cism of a model that can't predict the two biggest macroevents of the 
last 80 years. A rnodel whose predictive ability is so weak, it can hardly 
be relied upon for policy guidance. With so many of the sarne policy-
makers in place after the crisis as before, relying on the same flawed 
models, it is no wonder that our recovery from the crisis has been so 
disappointing. 11 
1'hose who were so optimistic about the economy even as it was about 
to implode were guided ln their assertions by the prevalent models. Not 
only did such models deny the existence of bubbles - in spite of more 
than two centuries in which capitalism had been marked by volatility, 
much of it brought about by credit and asset bubbles- the models asserted 
that even if there were a bubble, globalization had enabled the effects of 
its breaking to be diversified away, ·1ney didn't even contemplate that 
the effects could have been a1nplified in a process of contagion. 
It is remarkable, given how poorly the models performed, how 
complacent some of the advocates of the model have been. Defenders of 
the model (such as Ben Bernanke) argue thal the rnodels actually worked 
quite well - for the purposes for which they were intended: 
"fhe standard models were designed for ... non-crisis periods, and 
they have proven quite useful in that context. 12 
Indeed, Bernanke argued that there was little wrong with the models 
themselves: 
the recent financial crisis was more a failure of economic engineering 
and economic management than ... of economic science. r·i 
Defenders of the model often go further, arguing that no model could 
deal with events that happen once in 80 years, accidents of nature that 
are intrinsically unpredictable. But thls misses three essential points: (1) 
The econon1y wasn't really performing well, in a fundamental sense, 
prior to the crisis; it was setting up the conditions - the excesses - that led 
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an exogenous event that struck the economy; rather the crisis was 
created, or at least enabled, by the economic policies that Bernanke and 
Greenspan pushed; And (3) the benefits of slightly better perforrnance 
in prediction in tirnes of "normal" economic activity are far outweighed 
by the failures in prediction in the context of deep downturns. lf we 
are concerned with overall societal welfare, macroeconornics should be 
focused on these deep downturns. Between the US and Europe, the loss 
in output as a result of the current downturn amounts to well over five 
trillion dollars, an amount far in excess of the benefits from improved 
fine-tuning of the econorny in normal tlmes over decades. 14 
Embarrassingly, son1e of the defenders of the current models go 
even further. One, Ed Prescott, gloated that this is the "golden age of 
econornics." 15 
Back to tl1e beginning16 
The tltle of the session provides a nutshell summary of today's predic-
ament. Prior to Keynes, there was, among classical economists, the 
general belief that markets worked well, that they were stable and effi-
cient. Ir1deed, so strongly were these beliefs held that in the midst of 
the Great Depression, a majority of American economists supported the 
notion that government should do nothing, Markets would self-correct. 
(rhese economists did not, of course, explain why matters had gone so 
disastrously.) 
Keynes provided an answer - a theoretical model, or perhaps more 
accurately, a set of theoretical models, with clear policy implications, 
the central tenets of which were: (a) markets were not self-correcting, 
at least in the relevant time span - unemployn1ent could persist; (b) in 
deep downturns, monetary policy was ineffective; and (c) fiscal policy-
governn1ent spending - could stirnulate the economy, by a multiple of 
the amount that was sper1t. 
The model provided an explanation both for the disaster that was 
associated with US President IIerbert Hoover's economic policies and 
for the successes of the New Deal and the war-led recovery in the US. 
Keynes's ideas were incorporated in 1946 US legislation that recognized 
the responsibility of lhe government to maintain the economy at full 
en1ployment, and entrusted the Council of Economic Advisers with 
formulating macroeconomic policies that would ensure that this would 
be achieved. In the ensuing decades, there were several instances- most 
notably under President John F. Kennedy - where Keynesian ideas were 
tried and tested, and worked. 
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But Keynes was never liked by those who believed in unfettered 
markets - who wanted to minimize the role of government - and the 
counterattack that began in the 1960s had remarkable successes in the 
ensuing decades. Prosperity meant that the Cireat I)epression quickly 
faded into ancient history, and the problem of the day was inflation, not 
unemploy1nent. The economics profession changed, too, demanding 
greater standards of rigor. The schism between microeconomics, which 
focused on •veil-functioning inarkets (which dlways "cleared," so that 
there was never any unemployment), and in which the central result 
was Smith's invisible hand, and macroeconomics, which focused on 
dysfunctional markets, which could be characterized by high levels of 
unemployment, was unsettling. 
;vfodern n1acroecono1nics can be viewed as growing out of an attempt 
to reconcile traditional Keynesian macroeconomics with microeconom-
ics. L7 'J'here were two ways to achieve such a reconciliation: try to adapt 
macroeconomics to the microeconomic model of the time, or try to 
glean from n1acroeconomics insights about what was wrong with the 
traditional microeconomic models and reform them accordingly. Much 
of the rr1ainstream of economics took the former course - just at the 
tinie that standard microeconomics was itself under attack, from the 
proponents of theories of imperfect and asymmetric information, game 
theory, and behavioral economics. 
Mainstream macroeconomics came to be dominated by two 
"churches" 1 use the terrn advisedly, because both were dominated by 
strong beliefs, whicl1 could be little altered by evidence and experience, 
though the style of argume11t seemed to suggest that both based their 
faith on a close examination of the empirical record. 
One school returned to the doctrines of the classical economists, 
holding that markets <'l'"orked well, that policy intervention was unnec-
essary. Some took the (seemingly absurd) view that what was widely 
viewed as unemployment was actually just leisure. Their theories were 
designed to explain the wide t1uctuations in the demand for leisure. 
When challenged with the observation that normally, when individuals 
are experiencing a period of extensive leisure, they feel happy, and yet 
there were ample indicators that ln recessions, that was not the case, they 
responded: that was a matter for psychologists, not for economists. 
They held two further, somewhat contradictory positions: govern-
ment policy 1-vas likely to be ineffective, and, if and when it had effects, 
it was counterproductive. 
In support of their models, they took a major step backward from 
the use of statistical inference. They constructed caHbrated models, and 
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using simulations, described the correlations between certain selected 
variables, comparing those correlations with observed correlations. In 
many cases, when one looked at the underlying behavior, for example, 
of savings or labor supply, it was in fact poorly described by the model. 
What had begun as an attempt to reconcile macro- and 1nicrobehavior 
seemed, in the end, to almost ignore what should have been the under-
lying microfoundations. 
Part of the reason for the failure of these models was their reliance 
on the concept of the fully rational representative agent with rational 
expectations - the notion that the economy could be •vell described 
as if it consisted of a group of identical such individuals. Such models 
couldn't embrace h1formation asymmetries: with a representative agent, 
these could only arise if the individual suffered frorn acute schizo-
phrenia, which would in turn be hard to reconcile with their assump-
tions of all-knowing rationallty. 
1-Ioreover, it is hard to have a robust financial sector in representative 
agent niodels: who is lending to whom'? Since all risk is borne by ttie 
same (representative) agent, financial structure can't matter. Not surpris-
ingly, banks then play no role. With the financial sector at the center of 
this, and many other crises, it is no wonder that these models had little 
to say - either before or after the crisis. 
'Jlle belief in rational agents with rational expectations was take11 
almost as an article of faith. My o•vn research into equilibrium models 
with asyrnmetric information but rational expectations dearly dernon-
strates the need for behavioral economics: even if models with informa-
tion asymmetries but rational agents with rdtional expectations are able 
to explain many phenomena that the standard n1odel with perfect infor-
mation fails to account for, there are many important phenomena that 
simply cannot be explained even within that model. 18 It should be clear, 
too, that the behavior of so many market participants in the run-up 
to the 2008 crisis cannot be recon(.iled with any model of "rational 
behavior with rational expectations," even if there were some market 
participants who profitably exploited others' irrationality. 
·rhe second of the two mainstream "churches" was a little - but orlly a 
little~· better. It too relied on variants of the representative agent model, 
n1aximizing utility over an infinite lifetime, with rational expecta-
tions. Accordingly, it too largely ignored financial rnarkets, credit, and 
a host of other behavior hard to reconcile with observed macro- and 
microbehavior. 
It can be thought of growing out of tl1c f·Iicksian fixed wage/price 
interpretation of Keynes. While basing itself on the standard co1npetitive 
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equilibrium framework, they recognized that t~ere c:)uld b? une~ploy­
ment, and the challenge was how to reconcile this reahty with the 
standard competitive equilibrium n1odel. 1'here was a simple answer: a 
single rnarket failure - prices and wages didn't adjust to the e~~ilibrium 
level. It was the smallest deviation from the standard competitive equi-
librium model that could give rise to persistent unemployment. But the 
fact that such a model could explain per"istent unemployment doesn't 
in fact mean that it provides a good explanation of what has actually 
occurred; it doesn't mean that the model is a "good" model. 
This particular cl1urch had implications that were as pernicious as the 
first. It essentially blamed the victim for unemployment. If only workers 
would accept lower wages then unemployn1ent would disappear, and 
the economy would be restored to its potential. The belief in this notion 
helps explain why central bankers, rather tl1an sticking to t~eir o:vn 
knitting_ trying to ensure financial stability- were so fo~d of d1sc:iss1~g 
labor market rigidities. It was unions and government 1ntervent1on in 
labor markets (through labor protection legislation, minimum wages, 
etc.) that 1vere at the root of the problem. lf only government allowed 
rnarkets to work as markets then the macroeconomy would behave as 
classical economists had predicted. 
But this was nonsense and was shown so by the current crisis. In the 
initial years of the crisis, the United States, with purportedly the most 
flexible labor market among the advanced countries, performed in many 
ways far more poorly than the Northern European countries. 
But the idea had long before been discredited: there are many econo-
mies with weak or essentially nonexistent unions and little or no effec~ 
tively enforced government protections that are marked by high_levels 
of unernployment,19 VVith Easterly and Islam, I sought to explain the 
levels of volatility across countries: excessive financialization appeared 
more important than wage rigidities.20 • 
Some advocates of these models recognize its limitations, arguing that 
it is, however, just the beginning of a research strategy that will, over 
tin1e, bring in more and more of the relevant complexities of the world. 
Anything left out - agency problems, flnancial constraints, a~~ so on~ 
will eventually be incorporated. (And especially since the cns1s, DSGl1 
models incorporating some of these features have been constructed.) To 
the contrary, I believe these models are not a good starting point. Such 
Ptolema\cexercises in economics will be no more successful than they were 
in astronomy in dealing with the facts of the Copernican revolution_. . 
lt should be clear then v"hY a reconstruction of macroeconomics is 
necessary. 
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The foundations of a reconstruction 
()nee one goes beyond the standard competitive equilibrium model, one 
can easily explain market failures, including n1arkets that do not clear. (It 
is real rigidities, not nominal rigidities, that, for instance, should be rele-
vant for the failure of the labor n1arket to clear.) Indeed, the presumption 
that markets were efficient (Adarn Smith's lnvisible hand) was reversed 
by the CJreenwald-Stiglitz theorern,21 which showed that whenever there 
•vas asyrnmetric information or imperfect risk markets - that is, essen-
tially always - rnarkets are not constrained Pareto efficient (taking into 
account the costs of obtaining information and creating risk markets). 
That has some important implications: privately profitable transactions 
rnay not be socially desirable. The banks may have incentives to engage 
in contracts with each other that make, for instance, the econo1nic 
system more unstable (which is exactly what they did). ·rhere are impor-
tant (pecuniary) externalities associated with individuals' actions that 
matter and which individuals do not take into account. Price changes 
have not just distributive consequences, bul also shift incentive compat-
ibility, self-selection, and collateral constraints.21 
These models not on \y provide a better explanation of the rigidities 
that exist (providing an explanation for real rigidities, e.g., in wages, as 
a result of efficiency wage effects23, 2'1), but suggest that there are other 
market failures - for instance, the failure of contracts to be fully iI1dexed ~ .. 
with significant macroeconomic consequences. "Ibey pick up strands of 
thought in Keynes (as well as others, like Fisher25) suggesting that wage 
and price flexibility 1nay be a problem: with unindexed contracts, real 
debt burdens worsen as wages and prices faIL They thus suggest that the 
natural dyn11mics of the economy may be unstable - the fall in wages 
and prices in response to a downturn may exacerbate the downturn, not 
correct it. 
It is strange, in fact, that macroeconomic theories focusing on wage 
and price rigidities became so fashionable, when in the Circat lJepression, 
wages and prices fell so deeply and rapidly. Would things have been 
better if they fell even faster'/26 
This illustrates another incoherence in the standard model: the n1ore 
rapid fall would have led to higher real interest rates, given that the 
nominal interest rate can't fall belo;v zero. The standard model focuses 
on the role of real interest rates. If so, more wage and price flexibility 
would have made rnatters worse. Of course, if real interest rates played 
tl1e central role that tl1e standard models assert, even \Nith a zero lower 
bound, there would be an easy way to lower the real interest rate, 
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through tax policy. A large but declining investment tax credit would 
confront firms with intertemporal choices that are similar to those asso· 
elated with hlgh real interest rates. 
But I don't believe, especially today, that the zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates is the central problem, the critical impediment to 
the restoration of the economy to full employment. Real interest rates 
in the United States are already -2'Mi. Does anyone really believe that 
lowering thern to -4oAi would solve the economy's problem? To be sure, 
a sufficiently large negative real interest rate might make a difference, 
but such a change would entail such an increase in uncertainty that we 
cannot be sure even of the direction of the effect. (I will return to this 
issue later.) 
Again, the representative agent model (and its descendants) imposed 
a stralghtjacket that made it difflcult to think clearly about what was 
going on. ·rne problem was not just that the 'l'-bill rate couldn't be nega-
tive, but the unavailability of credit to firrns and the adverse terms at 
which such credit was available. The spread between the lending rate and 
the borrowing rate was endogenous. There could be credit rationing -
indeed, the inability of banks to borrow ;vas the liquidity crisis that 
brought on the downturn. ·10 me, the strangest aspect of modern macr-
oeconon1ics was that central banks were using a model in which bank~ 
and financial markets played no role. 
The central questions of macroeconomics 
Thus, for me, the reconstruction of macroeconomics ba~ed on alterna-
tive models to those of the two prevailing "churches" of mainstream 
ecortomics is likely to provide better answers to the three central ques-
tions underlying deep downturns, and thus to provide better guidance 
for economic policy: 
a. What is the source of the disturbances? '[he standard models assumed 
that they were exogenous technology shocks - by implication, the 
Clreat Depression was marked by an episode of acute amnesia, where 
in large parts of the world, people got less productive! TI1e reality was 
that this and most other major downturns are man-made events.27 
The system creates thern. And that rneans it may be possible for us to 
at least reduce their frequency and depth. 
b. Why do seemingly srnall shocks (after all, even the sub-prime mortgage 
market was only a small fraction of global wealth) have such large 
effects? Standard theories describe the economy's buffers - how, for 
instance, price and inventory adjustments help stabilize the economy. 
Reconstructing Atacroecunu111ic Theory to Manage Economic Policy 29 
lnstead, it seems that the system often amplifies shocks. 28 And shocks 
spread, like a contagious disease. lndeed, a central concern of policy 
makers after a shock is preventtng contagion. But the standard models 
say that interdependence - global diversification ~ contributes to 
stability. Their implicit reconunendation for a group of individuals 
found to have smallpox would be global diversification - send a few 
with the disease to each locality. But we all know that this would 
have spread the risk and amplified th(' problem. 
c. Why do deep do1vntu111s last so long? Why does there seem to be such 
persistence? A.fter all, vve have the same human, physical, and natural 
resources today as vve had before the crisis. If markets worked well, 
we would quickly be restored to full employn1ent. Debt can't be the 
problem; after all, debt is just money that we owe to ourselves. It 
is a n1atter of distribution, and in the standard models, distribution 
doesn't matter. A.nd even if debt did n1atter (because distribution 
matters), standard theory says that there is still a new full employ-
ment equilibrium. The standard theory provides no explanation for 
why we don't quickly get there, other than wage and price rigidities. 
We should note that the losses after the breaking of the bubble are far 
larger than those associated wlth the massive n1isallocation of capital 
prior to the crisis. Moreover, the state variables (capital stock, labor 
supply, human capital) change slovvly. If (as in the standard model) 
there was a continuous mapping from state variables to the value of 
market equilibrium variables, then presurnably the requisite change 
in wages and prices would be small, so that even with imperfectly 
flexible wages and prices, the aggregate loss from the rigidities would 
be small. This would not, of course, be the case if there were n1ultiple 
equilibria, so that (with the same state variables) the econorny's equi-
librium could change dramatically. 29 It is, in fact, easy to construct 
models with such multiple equilibria, once one leaves the world of 
representative agents. There can even be multiple rational expecta-
tion equilibria.30 
Recently, I have been working on models in which there can be large 
changes in perceived wea!th.31 When individuals have different expecta-
tio11s (which can easily occur in the presence of differences in lnfor-
1nation even with rational expectations), then there is scope for them 
to engage in bets. Each of the two sides believes (in expectation) that 
they will win, and the surn of the believed wealth exceeds the "true" 
wealth. I refer to this perceived wealth as "pseudo-wealth." Of course, 
next period, when the bets are settled, one side of the bet will win, the 
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other lose, and pseudo-wealth will get destroyed. But if differences Jn 
beliefs persist, then new pseudo-wealth will be created. 
But if, for some reason, there are changes in the economy such that 
the ability and/or willingness to engage in such pseudo-wealth creation 
changes, then the total perceived wealth of the economy can change 
quickly. There will then be large changes (at current wages and prices) 
in levels of consumption and investment and other aspects of economic 
activity (lending). Such changes can occur even if prices themselves are 
actuarially accurate; but even more so if (as in Scheinkman et al.32) prices 
differ from actuarial value, and the disparity between the two can change 
quickly. ;\n event such as the bursting of a real estate bubble can change 
both the ability and willingness to engage in bets (and thus the level of 
pseudo-wealth in the economy), and the magnitude of the disparity of 
beliefs (before the crisis, some believed that there was a bubble, others 
that there was not; after the crisis, it was clear that there had been a 
bubble). 
Indeed, a crisis cart give rise to the rapid creation of 11egative pseu-
do-wealth, as creditors become rnore pessimistic about the ability of 
borrowers to repay their loans, while borrowers believe that they will 
repay (and act accordingly). 
The theory of pseudo-wealth can explain how, even when there are 
small changes in the standard state variables (physical, human, and 
natural capital), there can be large changes in macroeconomic behavior 
(in, for instance, aggregate consumption), for there can be large changes 
in perceived wealth, and the effects of these changes may not easily be 
offset by changes in relative prices - including interest rates. 
I do not have tirne to flesh out further how this reconstruction of 
macroeconomics (as it has proceeded so far and how it n1ay proceed in 
coming years) provides answers to these three questions. I want to move 
on, however, to how these theories, even in their imperfect state of devel-
opn1ent, provide policy frameworks that are far more likely to produce 
better macroeconomic performance - illustrating the links between 
theory and policy that have been the hallmark of Fitoussi's work. 
Importance of inequality 
First, though, I want to highlight one aspect of Fitoussi's work that is 
essential to understanding why the policy recommendations that he has 
urged - and which I believe are correct - differ so rnarkedly from those 
of the standard model. It is that di5tribution 1natters. If one is concerned 
about social justice, then this is obvious. But distribution matters even if 
one is just concerned about economic performance.-13 
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It matters, in particular, if the marginal propensi Ly to consume differs 
significantly for at the top and those at the bottom. While there is over-
whelming evidence that that is the case34 - reinforced by recent work 
focusing on consumption behavior in this recession35 - there are still 
those who believe to the contrary, citing >.-Hlton friedman's classic work. 
But Friedman, a devotee of free market economics, not surprisingly 
ignored the importance of credit constraints; >vhich explain why those 
at the bottom might have a higher marginal propensity to consume 
than those at the top.'.16 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (!993, op cit) have also shown that the distri-
bution of net worth among fir1ns also matters. An increase in the rela-
tive price of oil benefits oil producers at the expense of the oil users; but 
the latter are likely to contract output, employrnent, and investment 
as a result far more than the former increase output, employment, and 
ir1vestment, so that such a change will have a contractionary macroeco-
nomic effect. But the same would be true for a decrease in the relative 
price of oiL 
It is worth noting that to Lhose on. the right, this attention on distribu-
tion is an anatherna. A.s Robert Lucas forcefully put it, 
of the i-endencies that are harmful to sound econo1nics, the most 
seductive and ... poisonous is to focus on questions of distribution.37 
I might suggest that, to the contrary, of the tender1cies that have marked 
modern macroeconomics, the most seductive and poisonous is the 
failure lo pay due atte11tion to irtequality. 
Policy frameworks 
I begin n1y discussion of policy frameworks with two ideas that have 
played a central role in recent policy discourse: can austerity work, and 
can government spending work'? l then discuss the lirnitations of mone-
tary policy. 
Fitoussi has been particularly focused on how the answers to these 
questions are affected by a country being a member of a currency union, 
and I shall accordingly discuss the answers to these questions both in 
the context of the US and the countries in the Eurozone. 
A. Austerity and contractionary expansionJs 
The notion that the government could restore the economy to health 
by cutting back on spending - contractionary expansions - is one of 
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the strangest to have emerged in recertt policy debates. Yet, austerity is 
in fashion in rnany quarters, buttressed by an occasional study (most 
notably the work of Alesina and Ardagna).39 lt is remarkable that the 
idea ever gained fashion, and even more so after the studies that under-
pinned it were thoroughly discredited (even by the IMF40). 
Hoover's austerity is widely given credit for helping turn the stock 
market crash of 1929 into the Cl-reat Depression; the policies that 
the IMF-US treasury foisted on East Asia and Latin America similarly 
converted downturns there into recessions, recessions into depressions. 
By now, it should be clear that austerity has not worked in Europe -with 
unemployment reaching record levels. '['his is true even though there 
are some who have seen in the end of the recession proof that austerity 
works. But the end of a recession is not the sarne as a robust recovery; 
and even with the "official" end of the recession, per capita GDP reniains 
belo;v what it was before the crisis, and unemployment rates, especially 
of youth, remain highly elevated. Several of the European countries can 
best be described as in a depression. Moreover, the real test of the success 
of an e<..:onomic policy is not whether the economy eventually returns 
to full employment: every economic downturn eventually comes to an 
end. It is the depth and duration of the downturn and the magnitude 
of the long-terrn damage. 1\usterity, in these terms, has been a disaster: 
the cumulative gap between actual and potential output ls already in 
the trillions. Today, the Eurozone economies are some 15 to 20911 below 
where they would have been had there been no t_Tisis, and the gap is 
not closing. Countries that engaged in less contractionary policies did 
less badly. I believe austerity has been a key factor in contributing to 
Europe's poor performance Jn the years since the crisis. 
There have been some discussions of instances ln which government 
cutbacks have been associated with e<..:onomic expansion. Sarne have 
suggested that these benefits arise from supply side responses (e.g., as 
a result of the lower tax rates, now or in the future, there is a negative 
balanced-budget multiplier). But in situations such as the current one, 
where aggregate dernand is limiting output, supply side responses can 
even increase unemployrnertt and have an adverse effect on output: the 
downward pressure on wages shifts the distribution of income toward 
profits, lowering aggregate demand. This suggests that the few instances 
of government cutbacks bringing on expansion must be special and 
peculiar. And indeed that is the case: they happened in small countries 
fhat had the good fortune to have exports expand n1ore than enough 
to fill the gap in aggregate demand caused by reduced government 
expenditures. 
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crhey arc typically instances where (a) the country's tradiI1g partners 
were growing, so the export market was expanding; and (b) the country 
had a flexible exchange rate, so it could quickly become more competi-
tive by lowering interest rates or undertaking other policies that affect 
the exchange rate. 
For Europe and A.merica 11ow, the notion that exports could fill t11e gap 
created by reduced govern1nent spending is a chimera, especially in view 
of the current global slovvdown. And this is especially so for the weak 
countries in Europe. With their fixed exchange rate with their major 
trading partners in Europe, austerity is designed to improve compe-
tiveness by forcing down wages and prices, in a process called internal 
devaluation. But internal devaluation has never worked to restore an 
economy to health, partly because the decreased wages increases the 
burden of debts denominated in euros. The decreased demand for non-
tradeables typically more than offsets any gains from increased exports. 
But looking across Europe, the growth in exports has been at best 
disappointing; the improvements in the current account position are 
mainly a result of the decreased imports as a result of lower incomes. 
(Part of the reason for this is that the ECB, focusing on intlation, allowed 
interest rates to remain high relative to those in the US, increasing the 
value of the euro.) 
Perhaps the strongest criticism of Lhis approach to economic recovery 
is (to the extent it is successful) it is a policy that is aimed more at shifting 
den1and away from others than at increasing global aggregate demand.41 
Indeed, by lowering incornes in the afflicted countries and increasing 
the burdens of their debts, it reduces global aggregate demand. 
But for those ln the Eurozone, with an exchange rate that cannot 
adjust, with a slngle market, where capital (in principal) can flow freely, 
and wlth a single currency but without the institutions necessary to 
rnake a single currency 1-vork, the abandonment of austerity~ without 
further reforms in the structure of the Eurozone - poses its own prob-
lems: Weaknesses in Spain and Greece, for instance, are caused not just 
by the lack of government spending, but by lack of lending - an almost 
inevitable consequence of the failure to have a banking union. With a 
weak private sector, the burder1 on government is all the greater. And 
if somehow, the economy is restored to full employrnent, large current 
account deficits are likely to show up in many of the countries. 
If a single currency is to work, then, not only must the policies of 
austerity be reversed, but other reforms in the structure o(the Eurozone, its 
policies, and its institutions will have to be undertaken. 1\t a minimum, 
there will have to be some form of mutualization of debt, a robust 
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banking union, with con1mon supervision, resolution, and most impor-
tant, deposit insurance, and a convergence strategy. 
Here is where Europe failed most - in its diagnosis of what was 
required for convergence, for the countries to be sufficiently sin1ilar 
that they could share a cornmon currency. 1'he lvfaastricht convention 
was based on neoliberal notions that, if only the government managed 
the macroeconomy well, the private sector would ensure that all else 
would go well. Thus, the EC:B was given the mandate of errsuring price 
stability, and the growth and stability pact required that countries 
joining the euro would have low deficits (under 39-IJ of GDP) and low 
debt (under 609-iJ of GDP). But as country after country went ir1to crisis, 
it became clear that these conditions were neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for convergence. Spain and Ireland both had surpluses and low 
debt-to~GI)P ratios before the crisis, and yet, after Greece, they were 
the first to join the tong list of countries facing difficulties. lt was clear 
that it tvas private sector excesses that were at fault, not government 
excesses, and yet the Eurozone framework had no way either to detect 
or to respond to such excesses. Tougher agreements to make sure that 
fiscal imbalances do not appear in the future would not have prevented 
the last crisis and vvill not prevent the next one. But· the austerity meas-
ures that are now being imposed will make a full recovery fron1 this 
crisis more difficult. 
Long-run convergence will require parallel increases in costs of 
production in the different countries, which can be achieved only 
through convergence of productivity and, given well-recognized down-
ward rigidities in \'Vages, faster vvage increases in countries with higher 
increases in productivity. c:onvergence of productivity increases will 
require the laggard countries to embark on industrial policies ·- more 
than just creating a "conducive environment," again as assumed by the 
neoliberal models. But industrial policies were effectively discouraged 
under the EU framework. c:onvergence and growth could also be facili-
tated by more infrastructure investment, financed by the EU as a whole; 
but while there were generous funds for new entrants to the EU, funds 
for the lagging countries have not been sustained. 
Instead of creating a framework that would facilitate convergence, 
they created one that exhibits dynamic instability: with each country 
responsible for its own banking systenl, and with confidence in a coun-
try's banking system inevitably depending on the country's ability and 
v»illingness to bail out troubled banks, money flees weak countries and 
its banks, making tltem even weaker. Private contraction amplifies the 
effects of public austerity. So too, the obligation of citizens to pay for 
Reronstn1cl'ing 1Vfacroeconornic Theory to i'-.fanage Eronomic Policy 35 
their parents Inisdeeds - but only if they remain ln the country·- induces 
skilled labor to leave, increasing the burden on those remaining. 
While the crisis made the problems of the euro-structure clear, they 
were present long before. Indeed, the euro helped create the crisis: for 
the markets seemed to l1ave vastly overestimated the extent to which 
the single market/single currency had reduced risk (another example of 
market irrationality), leading to excessive lending to the afflicted coun-
tries. And the structure of the Eurozone, based on neoliberal doctrines of 
efficient and stable markets, provided no way to curb the excesses thus 
generated. 
B. 'l"he multiplier42 
Those on the right not only believe that government action is not 
needed, but that it is likely to be ineffective. 
There has been considerable discussion of the magnitude of the rnulti-
plier associated with goverr1ment spending, with critics of expansionary 
government spending suggesting that it is low, zero, or even nega-
tive. They look at the experience of different countries over Jong time 
periods. Such analyzes should be an important warning of the foolish-
ness of mindless regressions. C)f course, when the economy is at or 11ear 
full employment, the multiplier (correctly rneasured) will be low. Even 
then, measurement problems (GI)P is riot a good measure of ecor1ornic 
output, providing only a biased estimate of economic performance 
when the share of government expenditure increases43 ) and econo-
metric problems bedevil such analyses. But the question is, what will 
the multiplier be ~vhen there is a high level of unemployn1ent and large 
underutilization of capacity? Since we have not had the levels of unem-
ployment and capacity utilization that we are now experiencing since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s- and the structure of the economy 
was markedly different during the Great Depression than now- there is 
no way we can, witl1 confidence, extrapolate the experiences of previous 
post-l)epression do>vnturns to the current situation.44 
Economic theory, though, provides a compelling framework for ar1alysis. 
1he problem is lack of aggregate demand. Government spending increases 
aggregate dernand. \Ve can identify leakages (frorn savings and imports) 
and, on the basis of that, calculate the multiplier. Traditional analyses, 
based on do-wnturns of short duration, fot11sed on one-period multipliers: 
two years from now, the thinking went, the economy would presumably be 
back to full employment, and the multiplier ;vould be zero. But this down-
turn is long-term, so in calculating the rnultiplier, we should calc"Ulate the 
impacts not just for this period, but for subsequent perlods as well. 
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For the lJnited States, this kind of analysis yields a multi-period multi-
plier (with reasonable values of savings and in1port coefficients) in the 
range of 1.5 to 2. 
The next question is: are there reasons to believe that there are reactions 
from market participants that will amplify or reduce these effects, that 
is, are there "crowding in" or "crowding out" effects? Again, in normal 
periods, the c:entral Bank, worried about an overheated economy, raises 
interest rates and tightens credit, discouragirtg investment. The result 
is that government spending cro¥lds out private investment. But now, 
the Fed is committed to keeping interest rates low and doing what it 
can to increase the availability of credit- 'fhis explains again both why 
estimates of the multiplier based on normal periods are irrelevant, and 
why, in this case, the multiplier will not be reduced by crowding out of 
investment. 
There n1ay, in fact, be crowding in of investment -- if government 
spending, for example, goes to public investment, and public invest-
ment is complementary to private investment. Alexander Field,45 for 
instance, makes a persuasive case for the theory that infrastructure 
investment during the I)epression enhanced private sector productivity, 
and that this helped lay the foundations for strong growth after World 
War IL tvtore recently, government investments in the Internet and the 
life sciences have clearly spawned entire industries. 
·rhe Barro-Ricardo hypothesis suggests that the increased indebtedness 
of governn1ent >'<ill lead to more savings (to offset future tax liabilities), 
and thus that government debt financed spending crowds out consump-
tion. There is little evidence of such an effect in recent years; in faci:, 
the Bush tax cuts gave rise to soaring deficits, ''"hich were followed by 
savings falling to near zero.46 To believe in the Barro-Ricardo model, one 
would have to hypothesize that in the absence of the tax cut, savings 
would have been markedly negative. 
'rhe criticisms of the hypothesis are well known: it ignores capital 
constraints and distributive effects. Indeed, there may even be "crowding 
in" of consumption. First, if goverrnnent spending is for high-return 
investment, in a period such as the current one where government can 
borrow at a negative real interest rate, the government's balance sheet 
will be improved; thus (in the world of rationality, in which taxpayers 
see through the public veil), savings would be reduced.47 There would be 
crowding in of consumption, not crowding out. 
Moreover, if, as we have already noted is the case now, the downturn 
is likely to extend for several periods, some of today's savings will be for 
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know that incomes in future periods will be higher than they other-
wise vvould have been, meaning that their lifetime budget constraint has 
moved out. This again leads to increased consun1ption today.48 
Of course, a good 1nultiplier analysis takes iI1to account the fact that 
different kinds of expenditures have different multipliers. What matters 
is not what the average multiplier has been in the past, but the effect 
of a well-designed expansionary policy today. We have suggested that 
spending on investments in the US today on education or research has a 
far higher multiplier, say, than or1 contractors in Iraq.49 
For some highly indebted countries, the additional borrowing to 
finance expansionary investment-oriented fiscal pollcy would come at 
a high price; they would have to pay increasingly higher interest rates, 
which might constrain what they could spend overall on output-ex-
panding projects.50 In principle, the market should realize this, in wl1ich 
case the greater indebtedness could lead to a lo•vering of interest rates. 
But there is no shortage of evidence of market irrationality; and whether 
justified or not, if increased indebtedness leads to higher interest rates, 
governments may have to employ another strategy, making use of the 
balanced-budget rnulti.plier. 
Traditional analyses suggested that the balanced-budget multiplier is 
unity. But well-designed increases in taxes and expenditures cm have a 
balanced-budget multiplier that is much larger, plausibly twice the tradi-
tional nu1nber1 for example, recognizing that the 1narginal propensity to 
consurne at the top is low relative to that elsewhere, and tax hikes at the 
very top reduce consumption by far less than the increased expenditures 
expand it. 'f3king advantage of crowding iT1 of consumption and invest-
nient can further enhance the balmced-budget multiplier. 
Indeed, there are some taxes that might even stimulate demand. An 
increase in the estate tax would encourage the elderly to consurne more 
today; the imposition of a carbon tax would encourage investment in 
buildings and equiprnent that reduced carbon emissions. So too might 
an increase in a tax on dividends.51 
ln short, there is every reason to believe that well-designed govern-
ment policies could be very effective in stimt1lating the economy. Keynes 
was right about there being a multipiicr - and advances since then have 
sho\.\'n how that multiplier can actually be increased. 
C. Debt and deleveraging 
There are many in Europe and Arnerica who believe that our current trou-
bles arise from excess debt, at both the household and national level. 'lhose 
focusing on debt at the national level have warned that debt financed 
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spending will be counterproductive in the long-run. Much of this view has 
been based on the now-discredited work of Reinhardt and Rogoff, who 
contended that once debt exceeded 90%, the adverse effect on gtO"-'th 
increased significantly. Interestingly, they never tested the hypothesis -
they never checked the statistical significance of any observed differences 
in growth of countries with <lebt-to-(Jl)P ratios below and above 90o/<J.52 
A large Hterature has now called attention to other failings - the lack of 
attention to causality (it was the recession that caused slow growth, not 
the other way around); to the difference in circumstances. l)oes it make 
a difference whether the debt is borrowed in one's own currency or in 
another currency? Whether one is a reserve currency count·ry? Was the 
debt generated by war or by gross incompetence? America left World War 
!I with a debt of 130'l-D of GDP, and yet in the ensuing decades the country 
experienced its fastest rate of growth (and the growth was shared growth). 
So too, Martin Wolf has commented that if debt held back growth, 
England would 11ever have experienced the industrial revolution, for it 
emerged from its wars with France with massive debts.53 The vvide range 
of experiences shows at the minimum that debt is not destiny. 
lt is noteworthy that the debt pessimists have never come up with a 
coherent theory for why debt itself should lead to lower growth- except 
if countries listened to the debt pessimists and adopt austerity measures 
in response. Older literature for a closed economy emphasized that we 
sin1ply owe it lo ourselves - and in the standard representative agent 
model that would mean that there would be no effect. In the currently 
unfashionable life cycle models, debt can displace capital and lead to 
lower levels of per capita income, but it does not lead to a lower rate 
of growth (although in the transition period growth would be smaller). 
1\nd in an open economy increased indebtedrtess to foreigners -;vould 
lead to lower standards of living for the citizens (they are poorer), but 
not to lower rate of growth. 
Private indebtedness can, however, have significant effects- although 
in the neoliberal frarnework, whatever the private market decides is bv 
definition "right."54 That ignores the pervasive market failures that w~ 
noted earlier, associated with in1perfect and asymmetric information 
and imperfect risk markets. 
Many have pinned their hopes for a quick recovery on deleveraging. 
There was excess private (mainly household) debt prior to the eris.is -
especially so once the housing bubble had broken. This indebted-
ness puts a damper on household spending. However, households are 
working down this debt. ()nee they do so, consumption will recover, or 
so it is believed. 
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IHgh levels of indebtedness do have an adverse effect on consump· 
tion, both because of the real wealth effect and because of the effect it 
has in imposing borrowing constraints (which my owrt work on imper-
fect capital markets, arising out of asymmetric inforn1alion, has empha· 
sized). Still, it would be foolish to think that even after deleveraging, 
consumption will return to anything like it was before the crisis. 
·rhe use of representative agent models has obscured what was going 
on in the US before the crisis: the bottom 80o/o were consuming approxi-
mately 11.{J''th of their income. Even after they deleverage, even after the 
financial sector is fully restored, we shouldn't expect them to consume, 
on average, more than 10096 of their income. With the top 20% garnering 
for themselves some 40910 of national income, and with their savings 
rate being roughly 15o/t1, one should expect a national savings rate of 
sorr1e 6% - somewhat higher than we see today but sornewhat lower 
than the prevailing rate in lhe US in earlier decades, The continuing rise 
in inequality provides an additional argument for why we should not 
expect a return of the savings rate to pre-crlsis levels. 
The puzzle is why hasn't the US savings rate increased even 1nore (frorn 
slightly more than zero to around 4.5!Yo today). The answer may have to 
do with slow adjustments in consumption patterns, which are aspects 
perhaps not adequately incorporated into the traditional models. 
If, of course, we do get recovery of the economy through consump-
tion, we should be worried: it would mean a return to unsustainable 
patterns of the kind that marked the pre-crisis days. 
Interestingly, the representative agent model without finar1cial 
constraints would suggest that leverage doesn't matter at all. Debt 
simply reflects an ownership claim on a stream of returns - a transfer of 
money from debtors to creditors; but such transfers have no effects in 
this modeLss 
D. The liquidity trap and the zero lower bound 
Before the crisis, many economists argued that monetary policy was, 
and should be, the main vehicle for regulating macroeconomic activity, 
which the governn1ent carried out by manipulating interest rates. It was 
the most effective and least dlstortionary instrument of government 
policies. 
l have never found convincing evidence for many aspects of these 
doctrines, and I have always found the theoretical arguments uncon-
vincing. Indeed, the relationship between real interest rates and invest-
1nent (especially outside of real estate) is hard to establlsh. In most 
models, if nominal and real interest rates are both put in the right-hand 
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side of a regression, nominal interest rates appear to have rnore impor-
tance. Moreover, the notion that monetary policy is non-distortionary -
or at least less distortionary than fiscal policy - is a fiction that arises 
from the sirnplisti.c aggregative niodels commonly employed. Reliance 
on monetary policy forces adjustments to macroeconomic disturbances 
to be borne by interest and LTedit sensitive se<-tors. There is no general 
theory suggesting that making these sectors bear the cost (almost surely 
shrinking these sectors relative to what they otherwise would be) is 
optimal in any sertse. 
In this crisis, the Ved (along with other central banks) has lowered 
interest rates to near zero - real interest rates have become negative -
without producing much of a stimulative effect - indeed, far less than 
was desired or hoped. I was not surprised, knowing that in the flawed 
modeling of invcstrnent in the standard model credit availability and 
its determinants, risk, and risk aversion are given short shrift. And as we 
noted above, even if the I-bill rate is low, what matters is the lending 
rate, and the spread between the two is an endogenous variable. 1l1e 
lending rate may not fall in tandem with the decrease in the T-bill 
rate. 
As Keynes' view of the inefficacy of monetary policy has seemed to 
triumph, those who believe in the standard model have suggested that 
its fundamental problem is the "zero lower bound" on interest rates, 
a variant of the Keynesian liquidity trap. But the situation during the 
(Jreat Depression was completely different from today's. Tl1en, prices 
were falling at lOo/o a year, so the real interest rate - as interest rates 
approached zero - was 10'16.56 lOday, the real interest rate is -2°/o. There 
is no reason to believe that if (expectations of) the inflation rate were 
to rise to 4'1i1 or even 6%, and the real interest rate fell to -4% or -61Yo, 
fherewould be a surge in investment After all, there is excess capacity in 
many sectors, especially in real estate. Getting funds at a lower rate is no 
reason to boost one's excess capacity. (To be sure, there is a fast enough 
rate of inflation to make the real interest rate negative enough to perhaps 
stimulate investment. But the uncertainty brought about by this change 
in economic policy would itself have adverse effects on investment.57) 
Again, the use of overly simplistic models has obscured some poten-
tially important adverse effects of lower interest rates, including lower 
long-term interest rates achieved through quantitative easing. This 
would have the potential to partially or totally offset the alleged benefits 
assumed to arise, particularly if the interest elasticity of investment is 
small. There are, for instance, complex distributive effects. 'lTaditionally, 
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that being the case, the redistributive effects seen in this scenario would 
be expected to enhance aggregate demand. IIowever, if debtors have 
long-term fixed-i11terest contracts, and if there are groups like the elderly 
who are dependent on the income from government T-bills and bonds, 
the effects rnay well turn out to be negative. ·rhis is especially so because 
the marginal propensity of the elderly to consume may be higher than 
that of mortgagees and/or if QE results in a much greater decline in T-bill 
rates than in mortgage rates. 58 If quantitative easing leads to commodity 
boon1s (a question that rernains in contention), then there is a distrib-
utive effect from households to commodity producers, which almost 
surely has a down•vard impact on aggregate demand. 
fn a world of full rationality, as assumed in the traditional models, 
there is a further negative effect: the long-tern1 bonds that the Fed is 
buying now will be sold back at a capital loss. The government ls (in 
effect) buying long-term bonds at a peak price. Therefore, under the 
Barro-Ricardo hypothesis, households should rationally include the 
expected capital loss in their budget constraints and, thus, reduce 
consumption. (I'his is the case whether or not accounting rules require 
the governn1ent to recognize the loss, or whether or riot the Fed goes 
through machinations to avoid selling them at a Joss by holding them 
to maturity. )-'9 
The traditional mechanism by which lower (long-term) interest rates 
might benefit the cconorny is an increased flow of credit at better terms -
but that does not seem to be playing a major role today, perhaps for five 
reasons: (a) 1l1e firms that are most constrained by borro\-ving, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME), remain constrained, because the supply 
of funds is constrained - while the big banks were giver1 huge amounts 
of money, and repaired their balance sheet through monopoly profits 
and speculative activities, the smaller regional and cornmunity banks 
upon whom the SMEs depend remain weak; (b) Large multinationals 
are awash with trillions in cash, small changes in interest rates are not 
likely to induce the1n to invest when they were reluctant to do so before, 
and when they do invest, it is likely not in the US; (c) The consolidation 
of bartks as part of the flawed atte1npt to preserve the banking systen1 
has led to non-competitive markets, for example, in mortgages, so that 
rather than just passing on lower Interest rates to customers (as would 
happen in a competitive n1arket), lenders have enjoyed larger spreads; 
(d) In a world of globalization, money goes to where the returns arc 
highest - and right now, that seerns elsewhere than the US and Europe 
money is going where it's not needed and not going where it is needed; 
And (e) in a world of globalizatioI11 what one central bank does can (and 
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often will) be undone by other central banks: one adds Hquidity to the 
global financial system, while others take it out.60 
The Fed has stressed the benefits from high stock market prices, 'This 
effect, of course, is only relevant for those who own stocks. But even 
then, the size of the effect is questionable. The Fed has announced 
that its int·erventions are temporary. If so, why should the effects be 
long lasting - why should they affect long-run budget constraints? (To 
be sure, some may gain from selling bonds when they are high, but 
others will lose from selling bonds at a loss. But in a representative 
agent model, these should largely cancel out.) The effects can be longer 
lasting, if somehow, the higher stock price shifts expectations in a way 
that moves the economy into another equilibrium - but again we have 
moved outside the standard representative agent model. 
Finally, in the standard putty-clay model, firms, able to get access to 
long-terrn capital at a very low interest rate, will invest ln highly capi-
tal-intensive technologies, becallSC wages have not fallen as much a~ 
the cost of capital. But this means that, at any given level of demand 
for output, employment will actually be reduced. Thus, loose monetary 
policy t·oday rnay be setting up the conditions for a jobless recovery 
in the future. Even today, the outlines of such a situation are already 
visible. The knowledge that weaker demand for labor lies ahead affects 
consumption demand directly and indirectly, as it puts further down-
ward pressure on wages, worsening the distribution of income. 
The irnportance of this is not that >ve should have tight rnonetary 
policy. It is that we cannot rely on monetary policy for our recovery, 
and that other government policies have to be put in place to offset the 
potential and real adverse effects that we have described. 
To return to Europe: While American monetary and regulatory policy 
before the crisis was flawed, both in theory and in its execution, at least 
the mandate of the Fed went beyond just limiting inflation - in the 
mistaken notion, referred to earlier, that controlling inflation was neces-
sary and almost sufficient for strong growth, 'foday, the Fed's mandate 
includes employment, output, and financial stability, and some Fed 
governors have advocated "en1ployment targeting," at least until the 
economy returns to a more normal level of une1nployment. 
[t >.Yas, as Fitoussi has repeatedly reminded us, a mistake to have the ECB 
focus exclusively on inflation, and it was even more of a mistake to put 
such a mandate in a treaty, making a change in the mandate - a change 
which should have been effected by changed perceptions of macroeco-
nomics- so difficult. But it is even more problematic in a world of global 
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interest rates near zero, while the EC:B has not responded in kind. 0 rhe 
result is a stronger exchange rate and a weaker European economy. Lack 
of global monetary coordination has a price, but in this case, it ls Europe 
that is bearing the brunt of the costs, 
Alrnost surely, even with its rr1a.ndate, the ECB could have taken a more 
aggressi.ve stance, And this is where institutions and their design matter, 
someth1ng that Fitoussi has repeatedly emphasizL-'d.61 ·rhe notion of an 
independent central bank was sold partially on the idea that managing 
monetary policy was a technocratic: rnatter, to be left to skilled techni-
cians. Seemingly, there is a Pareto efficient monetary policy. But such a 
view is wrong and dangerously so. It is wrong on several accounts. 
Institutions do not exist in a vacuum: an independent central bank 
is effectively captured by financial 1narkets, and it is their interests and 
perspectives that the bank reflects. That the technocrats are not really in 
possession of the expertise that they would like the rest of us to assume 
they have is reflected in the fads and fashions that prevail, each believed 
with fervor, until they are thoroughly discredited. :Monetarism, moti-
vated in part by Friedman's belief that the less discretion given to the 
government the better, captured the imagination of Central Bankers in 
the 1980s- just at the time that evidence was mounting that the assump-
tion that the velocity of circulation was constant was wrong; and just 
as economic theory explained why it was credit, not mor1ey, that was 
needed for transactions, It should also be evident that the doctrines that 
p~evailed in the years before the crisis, most notably inflation targeting, 
d1d not serve our economies we!L 
All economic policies have distributive effects. There are risks asso-
ciated with all eco11omic policies, and different individuals bear these 
rls~s di~ferently. So the notion that there is a Pareto dominant monetary 
policy is a chimera. 
Concluding comments 
This is perhaps a good point to close: As Keynes rightly poir1ted out, 
poliLy is shaped by theories. In Keynes's day, it may have been theories 
promulgated decades earlier. In today's world, it seerr1s that lags have 
been reduced, with policy subjected to the ebb and flow of the fads arid 
fashions in the economic profession. The fads and fashions that domi-
nated iT1 the decades preceding the current crisis have not served us well-
the models/theories that guided policy were not just innocent bystanders 
in the crisis that unfolded beginning in 2008. ]'hey were critical ln the 
creation of the crisis and in the inadequate responses to it. Moreover, as 
--------------------------------~~------------ --
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I argue in my book The Price o( Inequality, these theories were also not 
innocent bystanders to the growth in inequality that has marked recent 
decades; the policies based on these theories were an important factor in 
the marked increase in inequality over the past 30 years. 
For decades, Fitoussi has been one of the few voices holding out against 
these intellectual trends. I-Ie insisted that models be based on common 
sense, that the common sense be informed by historical experience as 
well as en1pirical evidence. In the end, the theories he has pushed and 
the policies that are derived from them provide a far better understanding 
of our rnacroeconomy than the currently fashionable ones. But they also 
provide the basis of policies that are more consistent with underlying 
values of social justice, and democ1atic accountability and process.62 
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